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Abstract
Background: A Q-fever outbreak occurred in an urban area in the south of the Netherlands in May 2008. The
distribution and timing of cases suggested a common source. We studied the spatial relationship between the
residence locations of human cases and nearby small ruminant farms, of which one dairy goat farm had
experienced abortions due to Q-fever since mid April 2008. A generic geographic information system (GIS) was
used to develop a method for source detection in the still evolving major epidemic of Q-fever in the Netherlands.
Methods: All notified Q-fever cases in the area were interviewed. Postal codes of cases and of small ruminant
farms (size >40 animals) located within 5 kilometres of the cluster area were geo-referenced as point locations in a
GIS-model. For each farm, attack rates and relative risks were calculated for 5 concentric zones adding 1 kilometre
at a time, using the 5-10 kilometres zone as reference. These data were linked to the results of veterinary
investigations.
Results: Persons living within 2 kilometres of an affected dairy goat farm (>400 animals) had a much higher risk
for Q-fever than those living more than 5 kilometres away (Relative risk 31.1 [95% CI 16.4-59.1]).
Conclusions: The study supported the hypothesis that a single dairy goat farm was the source of the human
outbreak. GIS-based attack rate analysis is a promising tool for source detection in outbreaks of human Q-fever.
Background
Q-fever, a zoonosis caused by the bacterium Coxiella
burnetii, is an emerging public health problem in the
Netherlands. In May 2007, the first community Q-fever
outbreak was documented around a single village in the
province of Noord Brabant. A case control study carried
out subsequently suggested a role of warm, dry weather
conditions in addition to a residence location close to
ruminant farms [1].
The unprecedented magnitude (>3000 notified human
cases) and geographical spread within the province dur-
ing the following years (2008-2009) suggested multiple
sources of infection [2]. The affected area matches with
the part of the Netherlands that has the highest
concentration of dairy goat farms, some of which are
very large (>5000 goats) [3]. From 2005 to 2008, clinical
Q-fever represented by abortions or stillbirths in small
ruminants, was diagnosed at 22 large (>50 goats) com-
mercial dairy goat farms and 2 dairy sheep farms, mainly
in the affected province [4]. Although large dairy goat
farms were implicated, questions about exact transmis-
sion routes and risk factors remained unanswered.
I nM a y2 0 0 8t h em u n i c i p a lh e a l t hs e r v i c e( M H S )i n
the southeast region of the affected province was alerted
by a cluster of human Q-fever cases in an urban area
(88,000 inhabitants). Based on the distribution of cases
in time and place, a common source was suspected. The
MHS had been informed by the Animal Health Service
that a dairy goat farm was diagnosed with Q-fever in
their region. Some patients that were interviewed by the
MHS indicated a pet farm in their neighbourhood as a
potential source.
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cluster of human Q-fever cases in this urban area could
be linked to the suspected source on the basis of the
distribution of illness onset and residence location rela-
tive to small ruminant farms. Furthermore, the study
explored the usefulness of a generic geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) for source detection in the still evol-
ving major epidemic of Q-fever in the Netherlands.
Methods
Human Q-fever cases
Q-fever is a notifiable disease in the Netherlands and
the regional MHS was responsible for the outbreak
investigation. A regional laboratory provided the major-
ity of microbiological diagnostic services for the inhabi-
tants of the MHS region. Submitted serum samples
were screened with a C. burnetii complement fixation
test (CFT, Siemens, the Netherlands). Notification cri-
teria for acute Q-fever were a clinical presentation with
at least fever, or pneumonia, or hepatitis and a fourfold
rise in titre in the CFT or a single high titre or a high
titre in two samples without a fourfold increase (CFT
titre ≥1:4). All persons notified to the Dutch national
surveillance system for infectious diseases (OSIRIS) who
were residing or had visited the MHS region of Brabant
Southeast and who had an illness onset from week 16
(14 April 2008) to week 32 (10 August 2008) were
included.
A hypothesis generating questionnaire was used to get
insight into possible sources of C. burnetii infection.
Questions pertained to age, sex, day of illness onset,
self-reported symptoms and complications, and a range
of potential risk factors, such as travel history and occu-
pational exposure. A recall period of four weeks before
illness onset was used to investigate if cases had had
relevant exposures immediately before the incubation
period. Questionnaires to all notified cases were admi-
nistered by trained public health employees from the
MHS during house visits, or self-administered by mail.
Data on human cases was collected as part of the rou-
tine system of infectious disease surveillance and out-
break control. Because no additional information or
laboratory materials were collected from patients, a
medical ethical review was not needed.
Meteorological data
We determined the predominant wind direction by day
and calculated the number of days that the wind had
blown in every wind direction during the estimated
exposure period. These data were available for weather
station Volkel (station 375 of the Royal Netherlands
Meteorological Institute), located within 15 kilometres
from the centre of the cluster area.
Veterinary data
Veterinary data were obtained from the Animal Health
Service. A mandatory veterinary notification system was
only introduced on 12 June 2008 (week 24). If a veterin-
ary source was suspected based on the exposure infor-
mation from patients, the MHS notified the Food and
Consumer Product Safety Authority.
Data analysis
Residence locations of all Q-fever cases were plotted as
point data on a digital map of the area. The Animal
Health Service provided the locations and specifications
of goat and sheep farms that were located within 5 kilo-
metres of the average longitudinal and lateral coordinate
of the cases, thus defining the centre of the cluster. The
residential addresses of the cases was considered a
proxy for level of exposure to small ruminant farms. We
hypothesized that the attack rate would be higher for
persons living close to the source and would decrease
with increasing distance. Around each farm with more
than 40 small ruminants we made concentric rings each
expanding with a 1 kilometre radius (range 0-5000
meters) and a reference ring with a range from 5000 -
10,000 meters). Attack rates for residents living within
these zones were calculated using a digital map of popu-
lation distribution. Relative risks for 5 zones were esti-
mated using the 5000-10,000 meters zone as reference.
Mapping and spatial analyses were done with ArcGis 9
software (ESRI, Redlands, CA, USA).
Results
Between week 16 and 33 (14 April-15 August 2008) the
MHS Brabant Southeast notified 96 Q-fever cases. In 55
patients positive CFT titres were found in two sequen-
tial (≥14 days interval) samples (of which 42 cases had a
fourfold increase in titre) and 41 patients had a single
positive CFT titre. The median age of cases was 53
years (interquartile range 42-61) and the male to female
ratio was 2.3:1. Day of onset of illness was known for 95
cases (median 4 June 2008). Nineteen individuals (20%)
were hospitalised.
Eighty one (84%) of the 96 cases completed a question-
naire. Most commonly reported symptoms were fever
>38°C (95%), fatigue (83%), headache (70%), night sweats
(62%), dyspnoea (53%), malaise (52%), and myalgia (51%).
The majority of cases (79%) presented clinically with a
pneumonia. Five patients (6%) presented with hepatitis.
Seventy eight (81%) of the 96 cases that were notified in
the MHS region Brabant Southeast resided in one city
with 87,752 inhabitants and a surface area of 54.56 km
2
(1608/km
2). Eight cases were from adjacent municipali-
ties and 10 from more distant municipalities and none of
these reported to have a work address within the city.
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Page 2 of 7We estimated from the epidemic curve (Figure 1) that
the likely period of infection was from week 15 (mid-April)
to week 24 (mid-June). This encompassed the known two
to four week incubation period for C. burnetii and was
based on date of symptom onset for 95 of the 96 cases.
Veterinary investigations
There were 60 locations with small ruminants within the
5 kilometre zone around the centre of the human Q-
fever cluster. Seven of these locations were large farms
(A-G) with more than 40 small ruminants, including one
large dairy goat farm (A, >400 goats), one mixed sheep/
goat farm (E, 126 goats and 90 sheep) and 5 sheep farms
( B ,C ,D ,F ,a n dGw i t hb e t w e e n5 7a n d1 1 8s h e e p ) .
These farms are mapped in figure 2. Farm A reported an
abortion wave on 21 April 2008 (week 17) to the Animal
Health Service and submitted two aborted lambs for post
mortem examination. C. burnetii infection was confirmed
in placental tissue from aborted goats by immunohisto-
chemistry. The first abortions were noticed in week 15
(mid April) 2008. No other farms in the area reported
abortions in the weeks prior to the outbreak. At the time
of the visit by the Animal Health Service on 15 May
(week 20), 40 out of 120 pregnant goats had aborted
(33%), 20 (17%) had an uncomplicated pregnancy and got
healthy offspring, while another 60 animals still had to
deliver. No veterinary problems were reported by the
other farms. A pet farm in the part of the city where
most of the cases resided was visited by the Food and
Consumer Product Safety Authority. Three tested goats
and one sheep had a weak positive PCR (only one of
three Coxiella specific genomic targets positive). How-
ever these animals had not been pregnant recently.
Hygiene standards at the pet farm were good and none
of the employees of the pet farm developed symptoms or
had been diagnosed with acute Q-fever. It was concluded
that these animals were not the main source of the large
cluster of human cases.
Meteorological data
With an east to north-eastern wind most of the city lies
downwind of the dairy goat farm and could potentially
have been exposed to contaminated dust particles. Dur-
ing the study period these wind conditions were com-
mon in week 16 (14-20 April) with 4 out of 7 days and
in week 20 (12-18 May) with 6 out of 7 days (Figure 1).
GIS analysis
Distance-related attack rates and relative risks for
increasingly larger sequential ring buffers from each of
Figure 1 Epidemic curve of Q-fever and wind direction. Number of Q-fever cases in the Municipal Health Service region Brabant Southeast
by week of illness onset (n = 95, black bars); and number of days in the week with prevailing eastern or north-eastern wind (white bars).
Information on date of illness onset is missing for one case.
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Page 3 of 7the 7 large farms (A-G) are shown in Table 1. A gradual
diminishing relative risk with increasing distance was
observed for farm A, the large dairy goat farm with the
reported abortion wave, and two small sheep farms
B and C.
Farm A and B both showed a gradual diminishing
relative risk with increasing radius, with the exception
of the first 1-kilometer zone, possibly due to the small
denominator. There were no significant differences in
attack rates between farm A and B. The attack rates
within 2 and within 3 kilometres were significantly
higher for farm A than for farm C (p = 0.004 and p =
0.001 respectively). The highest attack rate for farm A
was for inhabitants residing in the south to south-wes-
tern direction within 2 kilometres of the farm. Persons
living in this zone had a much higher risk for Q-fever
than those living more than 5 kilometres away (Relative
risk 31.1 [95% CI 16.4-59.1]). In the 4-5 kilometre zone
f r o mf a r mA ,o n l y1c a s ew a sa d d e da n dt h er i s ko f
Q-fever for people living in this zone was very low. The
Figure 2 Map of the study area. Locations of goat and sheep farms with >40 animals (farm A-G) and residential addresses of Q-fever cases in
urban and rural areas, 14 April to 10 August 2008.
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Page 4 of 7other farms D, E, F, G had low attack rates close to the
farms compared to farms A-C and they did not show a
gradual diminishing relative risk with increasing distance
and were considered unlikely infection sources.
Discussion
Within an on-going large epidemic of Q-fever in a pro-
vince in the south of the Netherlands we identified a dis-
tinct urban cluster of notified Q-fever cases. We
combined epidemiological data on notified cases, veterin-
ary and meteorological data in a generic geographic
information system to analyse this cluster. The study
showed that living within 2 kilometres of a dairy goat
farm with abortion problems posed a high risk for Q-
fever. Furthermore, the time period between the duration
of the abortion wave on this dairy goat farm and illness
onset in the human cases suggests that airborne trans-
mission of C. burnetii from the dairy goat farm could
have been the cause of this outbreak. This was further
supported by predominant easterly winds on a number of
days that could have taken contaminated dust particles to
the people living southwest from the farm.
Findings from this urban outbreak are consistent with
those from the first community Q-fever outbreak in the
Netherlands that occurred in a rural area in 2007. In the
2007 outbreak, airborne transmission from nearby small
ruminant farms located to the northeast of the village
was suspected as the main route, facilitated by a predo-
minant wind direction from the east during a period of
extreme dry weather [1].
There are reports from the international literature that
C. burnetii particles can spread from farmland over long
Table 1 Attack rates of acute Q-fever among residents within circular distance rings around each potential source
(A-G) expressed per 100,000 persons over week 16-32 (14 April-10 August 2008), with relative risks (RR) and 95%
confidence intervals (95% CI)
Distance from source A B C D E F G
0-1 kilometre
Attack rate
1 0 0 413 178 0 0 0
RR
2 (95% CI) 0 0 53 (24-114) 8 (1-61) 0 0 0
Q-fever cases 0 0 35 1 0 0 0
Population 92 136 8482 562 119 281 1444
0-2 kilometre
Attack rate 376 352 203 46 0 13 76
RR (95% CI) 31 (16-59) 25 (13-49) 26 (12-54) 2 (1-5) 0 1 (0-5) 5 (2-13)
Q-fever cases 33 27 59 6 0 1 8
Population 8788 7671 29,098 13,022 9852 7632 10,582
0-3 kilometre
Attack rate 241 228 137 28 19 69 102
RR (95% CI) 20 (11-36) 16 (9-30) 18 (8-36) 1 (1-3) 1 (0-2) 4 (2-8) 7 (4-13)
Q-fever cases 59 58 69 9 4 12 28
Population 24,461 25,487 50,349 32,709 20,521 17,506 27,329
0-4 kilometre
Attack rate 124 133 101 26 60 147 98
RR (95% CI) 10 (6-19) 10 (5-17) 13 (6-27) 1 (1-2) 2 (1-4) 8 (5-13) 7 (4-12)
Q-fever cases 70 66 71 15 19 49 62
Population 56,585 49,570 70,151 58,002 31,425 33,270 63,547
0-5 kilometre
Attack rate 92 88 86 53 94 100 79
RR (95% CI) 8 (4-14) 6 (3-11) 11 (5-23) 3 (2-4) 4 (3-6) 5 (3-9) 6 (3-10)
Q-fever cases 71 74 78 51 54 71 72
Population 77,558 84,374 90,779 96,402 57,329 70,680 91,123
>5-10 kilometre
Attack rate 12 14 8 21 25 18 14
R R 111 1 1 1 1
Q-fever cases 13 13 8 39 40 21 17
Population 107,680 93,469 102,192 185,269 162,141 113,966 121,978
1 Attack rate: number of Q-fever cases per 100,000 population during the outbreak
2 RR = relative risk, attack rate divided by the attack rate of the reference category 5-10 km, with 95% confidence interval (CI)
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urban areas [5]. In a community outbreak in the United
Kingdom cases were identified up to 18 kilometres from
t h es o u r c e[ 6 ] .O u rr e s u l t ss u g g e s tal o wr i s kb e y o n d5
kilometres from the infection source. The role of wind
speed and direction is difficult to analyse when a farm is
infectious for a longer period of time.
Source detection
In the high incidence area in the south of the Nether-
lands there are thousands of locations with goats and
sheep in addition to the many cattle, pig and poultry
farms. In this environment the investigation and sam-
pling of all potential animal infection sources to explain
human clusters is impossible. Goats, sheep and cattle on
many farms throughout the country show serological
evidence of previous infection with C. burnetii.H o w -
ever, based on the experience since 2007, the prevailing
opinion among the human and veterinary public health
community is that abortion waves at large dairy goat
farms play the predominant role in transmission [4].
Abortion rates of more than 5% on large dairy goat and
sheep farms have to be notified since June 2008. How-
ever, abortions in deep litter houses with many hun-
dreds of animals might easily go unnoticed. Attack rate
analysis as proposed in the present paper could be an
additional tool for source detection.
In order to apply this method real-time, detailed geo-
graphic information with residence locations of cases
and farm locations, and early notification of human
clusters by health professionals are required. The com-
plement fixation test is known to be specific but defini-
tive diagnosis may be delayed because often paired
samples are required [7]. Increased awareness among
patients and physicians, as well as introduction of rapid
laboratory assays, such as PCR, may further reduce the
delay between onset of illness and diagnosis and notifi-
cation [8]. Moreover, in June 2008 Q-fever became a
veterinary notifiable disease. This legal framework has
facilitated communication between the human and
veterinary public health sectors. Clearly, it is essential
that the MHS can alert general practitioners in a region
where there is a small ruminant farm with clinical Q-
fever. Veterinary information on Q-fever status of farms
in the near proximity, for example clinical Q-fever or
positive bulk milk status, could facilitate to pinpoint the
most likely sources in an exposed area.
The analysis of the 2008 urban cluster was facilitated
by the relatively small number of farms in the area.
Even so, the attack rate analysis showed similar results
for three farms (A-C) that were located very close to
each other. The tool can provide only a rough indication
but could facilitate efficient source detection by placing
animal locations in classes of ‘possible’ and ‘unlikely’.
This would have to be followed by a veterinary risk
assessment and possible sampling at suspected farms.
Generating the attack rates requires experience in the
use of GIS software. When adequate tools for GIS ana-
lyses are available, the workload is limited and the pro-
cedure can be automated.
Limitations of the study
This retrospective cohort study was performed in a new
e n d e m i ca r e af o rQ - f e v e ri nt h eN e t h e r l a n d sw h e r e
dairy goat farming started recently. Q-fever was labora-
tory confirmed on the newly established dairy goat farm
but no systematic environmental sampling took place in
the cluster area. Therefore we cannot exclude that other
sources might have been present in the same time per-
iod in the region.
Most Q-fever infections remain asymptomatic or give
aspecific signs and symptoms. Differences in diagnostic
testing and alertness of general practitioners might have
led to ascertainment bias. To provide a reliable estimate of
the attack rate all patients with symptoms compatible with
Q-fever would have to be tested or population surveys
would have to be done to include asymptomatic cases.
Research priorities
Conclusive evidence of a link between certain animals
and human Q-fever cases can only be provided by
genetic analysis of human, animal and environmental
samples. Current typing techniques provide insufficient
contrast and methods for culturing and sequencing
carry bio safety concerns and are still under develop-
ment. The presented attack rate analysis assumes homo-
geneity in the distribution of Coxiella in each concentric
ring. In future analyses landscape features should be
taken into account to make a more informative analysis
possible. This should be combined with information on
movement patterns of human cases, recreational activ-
ities and other behavioural factors that might change
the risk of exposure.
Conclusions
We found a clear epidemiological link between a cluster
of human Q-fever cases and a Q-fever positive dairy
goat farm. The present study suggests an effective range
of airborne C. burnetii spread of <5 kilometres. GIS-
based automated attack rate analysis is a promising tool
that could classify animal locations as possible or unli-
kely infection sources. This methodology should be
transformed from a retrospective analysis to a real-time
pinpointing tool to guide environmental sampling of
potential sources. This requires close collaboration
between the human and veterinary public health sectors
to ensure timely detection of cases, identification of
plausible sources and standardised environmental
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Page 6 of 7sampling, and application of public health and veterinary
preventive measures.
Acknowledgements
Luppo de Vries and Wouter Boasson at the National Institute for Public
Health and the Environment provided technical support for the GIS-based
attack rate analysis. We also thank Yvonne van Duynhoven for critically
reading the manuscript.
Author details
1Centre for Infectious Disease Control, National Institute for Public Health
and the Environment, A van Leeuwenhoeklaan 9, PO Box 1, 3720 BA
Bilthoven, the Netherlands.
2Municipal Health Service ‘Brabant Zuidoost’,
Stadhuisplein 2, 5611 EM Eindhoven, the Netherlands.
3Laboratory for
Pathology and Medical Microbiology, De Run 6250, 5504 DL Veldhoven, the
Netherlands.
4Region East, Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority, De
Stoven 22, Postbus 202, 7200 AE Zutphen, the Netherlands.
5Department of
Medical Microbiology and Infection Control, Jeroen Bosch Hospital,
Tolbrugstraat 11, PO Box 90153, 5200 ME, ‘s Hertogenbosch, the
Netherlands.
6Department of Small Ruminant Health, Animal Health Service,
Arnsbergstraat 7, PO Box 9, 7400 AA Deventer, the Netherlands.
Authors’ contributions
BS, PV and WvdH were involved in designing the study and the protocol for
data collection. RtS, MW, LZ, AdB and PV provided the human, veterinary
and environmental data. BS and TV conducted the data analysis. TV
produced the map. BS produced the first draft of the paper, which was
revised by WvdH and PS following contributions from RtS, MW, LZ, AdB, TV
and PV. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 16 October 2009 Accepted: 16 March 2010
Published: 16 March 2010
References
1. Karagiannis I, Schimmer B, van Lier A, Timen A, Schneeberger P, van
Rotterdam B, de Bruin A, Wijkmans C, Rietveld A, van Duynhoven Y:
Investigation of a Q fever outbreak in a rural area of The Netherlands.
Epidemiol Infect 2009, 137:1283-1294.
2. Schimmer B, Morroy G, Dijkstra F, Schneeberger PM, Weers-Pothoff G,
Timen A, Wijkmans C, Hoek van der W: Large ongoing Q fever outbreak
in the south of The Netherlands, 2008. Euro Surveill 2008, 13, pii: 18939.
3. Schimmer B, Dijkstra F, Vellema P, Schneeberger PM, Hackert V, ter
Schegget R, Wijkmans C, van Duynhoven Y, Hoek van der W: Sustained
intensive transmission of Q fever in the south of the Netherlands, 2009.
Euro Surveill 2009, 14, pii: 19210.
4. Brom Van den R, Vellema P: Q fever outbreaks in small ruminants and
people in the Netherlands. Small Ruminant Res 2009, 86:74-79.
5. Tissot-Dupont H, Amadei MA, Nezri M, Raoult D: Wind in November, Q
fever in December. Emerg Infect Dis 2004, 10:1264-1269.
6. Hawker JI, Ayres JG, Blair I, Evans MR, Smith DL, Smith EG, Burge PS,
Carpenter MJ, Caul EO, Coupland B, Desselberger U, Farrell ID, Saunders PJ,
Wood MJ: A large outbreak of Q fever in the West Midlands: windborne
spread into a metropolitan area? Commun Dis Public Health 1998,
1:180-187.
7. Péter O, Dupuis G, Peacock MG, Burgdorfer W: Comparison of enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay and complement fixation and indirect
fluorescent-antibody tests for detection of Coxiella burnetii antibody.
J Clin Microbiol 1987, 25:1063-1067.
8. Schneeberger PM, Hermans MHA, van Hannen EJ, Schellekens JJA,
Leenders ACAP, Wever PC: Real-time PCR on serum samples is
indispensable for early diagnosis of acute Q-fever. Clin Vaccine Immunol
2010, 17:286-290.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
[http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/10/69/prepub]
doi:10.1186/1471-2334-10-69
Cite this article as: Schimmer et al.: The use of a geographic
information system to identify a dairy goat farm as the most likely
source of an urban Q-fever outbreak. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010 10:69.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Schimmer et al. BMC Infectious Diseases 2010, 10:69
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/10/69
Page 7 of 7